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Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust
Randal C. Picker*
The Court’s 2006 Term was an unusually active one for antitrust as
the Court decided four substantial antitrust cases. Each of the cases
will undoubtedly attract substantial academic attention.1 The overall
direction of the four cases is reasonably clear: plaintiffs face greater
regulatory obstacles to reaching the court system (Credit Suisse), are
more likely to get tossed from court without reaching a jury once
they get there (Twombly), and will have to work harder to make out
substantive antitrust liability (Weyerhaeuser and Leegin). Taken as a
group, the cases represent a substantial raising of the hurdles that
antitrust plaintiffs face, even, if each case represents a simple one-step
extension of current Supreme Court doctrine.
The Court’s antitrust term started with Weyerhaeuser2 in which a
unanimous Court extended its analysis of predatory pricing in Brooke
Group3 to predatory bidding. The standard predatory pricing case
concerns investing in losses through below-cost sales to achieve
monopoly power. One competitor is alleged to sell at a price below
an appropriate measure of cost in an effort to drive other competitors
from the market, so that once monopoly has been achieved, the first
seller can jack up its prices and more than cover its early losses.
Predatory pricing is the Loch Ness monster of antitrust: occasional

* Copyright © 2008, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo Leffmann
Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow,
The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory.
I thank the Paul H. Leffmann Fund and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for their generous
research support.
1 And like this article, some will address all four of the cases together. See Joshua D.

Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, 3
Competition Policy Intl 24 (Aut 2007).
2 Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co, Inc, 127 S Ct 1069 (2007).
3 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993).
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sightings that on further investigation turn out to be something else.
Predatory pricing has received substantial attention from economists
who can, as with much of game theory, spin out intricate stories in
which predatory pricing is sensible but find it hard to articulate
which real-world conditions will actually sustain it.4 Given that
difficulty, it is hardly surprising how mixed the caselaw is on
predatory pricing.5
But compared to predatory buying, predatory pricing is the easy
case, the fastball down the middle. The much more unusual situation
alleged in Weyerhaeuser is predatory buying: a producer buys more of
an input than it needs in order to push input prices up, sufficiently to
cause competing producers also buying the input to exit from the
market. Going forward, that eliminates competition to buy the input,
and the successful predator is left as the only input buyer (predating
to achieve monopsony, as opposed to predatory pricing’s push to
monopoly). In Weyerhaeuser, the Court rejected the much more
expansive approach formulated by the Ninth Circuit and instead
applied its 1993 Brooke Group approach for predatory pricing to
predatory buying.
In Twombly,6 in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Souter, the
Court transplanted its prior decision in Matsushita7 regarding
summary judgment standards to a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)). The Court concluded that an antitrust
complaint could not merely allege conspiracy but instead must set
forth a factual context that would allow illegal conspiracy to be
distinguished from legal parallel independent action. Matsushita had
implemented this rule for summary judgment motions, and Twombly
extends that rule much earlier in the case to Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
4 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic

Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Georgetown L J 2239 (1999-2000).
5 United States v AMR Corp, 335 F3d 1109 (10th Cir 2003).
6 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 127 S Ct 1955 (2007).
7 Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986).
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Justice Stevens dissented, joined, except in one part of his opinion, by
Justice Ginsberg.
In Credit Suisse,8 five justices joined an opinion for the Court by
Justice Breyer in concluding that federal securities law “implicitly”
precluded claims asserting antitrust violations in the sale of new
securities. That result tracked the Court’s prior decision in Gordon,9
which addressed another securities/antitrust intersection, as well as
the Court’s more recent preference for regulatory schemes over
antitrust as seen in Trinko.10 Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment, while Justice Thomas dissented and
Justice Kennedy recused himself.
Finally, on the last day of the Term, after announcing its hotlycontested decision in Seattle School District No. 1 on promoting racial
integration in lower schools, the Court announced its 5-4 result in
Leegin.11 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court overruled its
nearly-century-old decision in Dr. Miles12 and held that contractual
minimum resale price maintenance must be judged under the rule of
reason and is no longer per se illegal. In contractual minimum RPM,
a manufacturer—Sony—requires a retailer—Best Buy—to agree to
sell a Sony HD TV set for a price at least as great as a floor-price set
by Sony. In overturning Dr. Miles, the Court continued its trend of
killing off old Supreme Court precedents treating a variety of
practices as per se illegal. In addition, Dr. Miles was hard to square
both with the Court’s rule for nonprice vertical restraints adopted in

8 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing, 127 S Ct 2383 (2007).
9 Gordon v New York Stock Exchange, Inc, 422 US 659 (1975).
10 Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398

(2004).
11 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 127 S Ct 2705 (2007).
12 Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373 (1911).
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Sylvania and with its rule for unilateral price restrictions established
in Colgate.13
So all four cases are comfortably situated as natural steps in the
case-by-case evolution that is the common law of the Sherman Act as
created by the Supreme Court. Filling in the gaps in the caselaw, or
doctrinal tuckpointing as it were. But this minimalist description of
these cases captures poorly the overall sense of these cases and misses
substantial disagreement within the Court. As a group, these cases
impose meaningful limits on where antitrust will operate. For better
or worse—more on that below—each of these cases reduces the role
of private antitrust lawsuits, including the role of private antitrust
plaintiffs in initiating cases and the role of the courts in deciding
those cases.
Twombly will shrink substantially the ability of antitrust plaintiffs
to file a complaint and find conspiracies through discovery. Indeed,
the Court’s precise point was to eliminate what it saw as fishing
expeditions in discovery. In our joint system of public and private
enforcement of antitrust laws, this tilts the balance considerably
towards public enforcers (the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys
general). Credit Suisse explicitly looks to other governmental actors—
most directly, the Securities and Exchange Commission—as it
substitutes agency definition and enforcement of competition policy
in securities markets for private antitrust lawsuits in lower courts.
Both Credit Suisse and Twombly thus centralize antitrust
enforcement, while Leegin and Weyerhaeuser reduce the scope of the
substance of antitrust law itself. And while Weyerhaeuser was decided
unanimously, Leegin was 5-4, with Justice Kennedy writing for this
Term’s usual majority and Justice Breyer writing for the expected
dissenters. In a Term filled with disputes over the role that precedent

13 Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36 (1977); United States v Colgate,
250 US 300 (1919).
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should play, Leegin ended the Term with a full-out fight over the rule
of stare decisis in antitrust cases.
We should dispense with Weyerhaeuser and Credit Suisse quickly.
Weyerhaeuser is a one-off: a unanimous decision on an issue—
predatory bidding—that the Supreme Court hadn’t confronted
before and isn’t likely to see again soon. Credit Suisse is oddly situated
procedurally—that accounts for the dissent—and the result flows
naturally from the Court’s prior cases in the area. This isn’t to say
that there aren’t deep issues about the interaction of general
competition policy and more specific industry regulation—an
important topic worthy of a separate paper (hint)14—but Credit Suisse
doesn’t raise that topic directly. So I will offer brief discussions of
Weyerhaeuser and Credit Suisse before turning to more extended
discussions of Twombly and Leegin.
Twombly raises some basic questions about the mechanics of an
adversarial court system. Plaintiffs will often have much less
information about possible liability than defendants. To situate that
in antitrust, plaintiffs are rarely invited to the proverbial smoke-filled
rooms in which price-fixing conspiracies are hatched. The best pricefixing conspiracies will be those in which the least is known publicly.
This information asymmetry poses a dilemma if we intend to rely on
private enforcement of antitrust statutes. Will we let private plaintiffs
make bald assertions of conspiracy with few if any facts to
substantiate their claims? If so, we can be sure that antitrust plaintiffs
will delight in rifling the files of defendants hoping to discover
something—anything—that will make out a claim. But the alternative
to these fishing expeditions seems to be to allow some defendants to
get away with antitrust violations or to hope that the government will
target these conspiracies.

14 Dennis Carlton and I address many of these issues—though not the specifics of
Credit Suisse—in our forthcoming paper Antitrust and Regulation, in Nancy Rose, ed,
Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned (University of Chicago Press
2008).
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Leegin raises two important issues. One is a mixed question of
economics and institutional design: what is accomplished when a
manufacturer and a retailer agree on a minimum retail price? This is a
long-standing question, and Leegin recognizes that our best
understanding of contractual minimum RPM makes it difficult to
conclude that it is almost always pernicious. Given that, as a matter
of first impression, we wouldn’t treat contractual minimum RPM as
per se illegal. But Leegin isn’t a case of first impression—far from it—
and that takes us to the second issue in Leegin.
The Court has bobbed and weaved with contractual minimum
RPM since its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles condemning the practice as
per se illegal, but it had always chosen to duck rather than revisit Dr.
Miles. Leegin forced the Court to confront its approach to stare
decisis, at least in antitrust, if not more broadly. For the Court, stare
decisis turns, in part, on the textual context. When the Court
interprets the Constitution, Congress can’t overturn the Court’s
interpretation. If a prior constitutional ruling of the Court is to be
overturned, the Court must do it itself. But for statutes, if the Court
chooses one interpretation rather than another, Congress can always
jump in and revise the statute to impose its preferred interpretation.
Hence, says the Court, it should tread more lightly in overturning its
own interpretations of statutes. I think that that is wrong in
important ways and that the Court should move towards applying its
approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases to statutory situations
as well.
All of this takes us to the Court’s tools in antitrust. One of those
tools is specifying who the decision-maker will be in the first instance,
and Credit Suisse reflects a preference for specialized industry
consideration and the possibility of trading off competition concerns
against other values. In Twombly, the Court has its hand on every
possible lever of policy: direct control over the discovery rules and
hierarchical control over the district courts implementing them, and
yet the Court eschews sharp refined approaches for the much more
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blunt instrument of early-case dismissal. Finally, in Leegin, it isn’t
clear that the Court fully appreciates the tools in its hand, or if it does
so, it certainly doesn’t seem to want to acknowledge that. The
decisions of the Court interpreting the Sherman Act define the
default point for any subsequent congressional action. Setting that
point is a critical tool for establishing antitrust policy, and the
sharpness of that tool in turn is set by how the Court itself
approaches stare decisis in antitrust.
I. WEYERHAEUSER: DOCTRINAL SIMPLICITY AND THE
ENGINES OF COMPETITION
The claim in Weyerhaeuser is predation to monopsony. In English,
Weyerhaeuser was said to be paying too much for the red alder
sawlogs that it needed to produce lumber and was doing so to drive
its competitors for those sawlogs from the market so that it could
become the only purchaser of those logs. With those firms gone,
Weyerhaeuser would have a monopsony over the red alder sawlogs—
it would be the only buyer of those logs—and it could then reduce
the price that it would pay for those logs. This is predatory bidding—
predation to monopsony—the flipside of the much more familiar, if
still elusive in reality, predatory pricing, which is dropping sale prices
initially to drive competing sellers from the market so as to emerge as
the sole seller of a product.
Consider the facts of Weyerhaeuser itself. Ross-Simmons operated
a hardwood-lumber sawmill in Washington. Sawmills turn logs into
lumber, and indeed raw logs account for 75% of a sawmill’s total
cost. Ross-Simmons processed red alder sawlogs at its mill. Roughly
two decades after Ross-Simmons commenced operations,
Weyerhaeuser entered the northwestern hardwood-lumber market.
Over time, Weyerhaeuser expanded its operations, and by 2001, it
was purchasing roughly 65% of the alder logs available for sale in the
Pacific Northwest.15
15 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S Ct at 1072.
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Ross-Simmons saw a nefarious intent in this pattern and filed an
antitrust action alleging that Weyerhaeuser had used “its dominant
position in the alder solid market to drive up the prices for alder
sawlogs to levels that severely reduced or eliminated the profit
margins of Weyerhaeuser’s alder sawmill competition.”16 We now see
where we are. Ross-Simmons is not alleging that Weyerhaeuser was
seeking market power in the lumber market, that is, the market for
finished goods produced by sawmills.17 Instead, the claim is that
Weyerhaeuser was trying to limit competition in the purchasing of
alder sawlogs. With Ross-Simmons and other firms like it gone,
Weyerhaeuser would be able to dictate prices that it would pay to
purchase alder sawlogs. With its newly-acquired monopsony power, it
would push those prices down, and depending on how price sensitive
the alder sawlogs producers were, alder sawlogs sales would drop, as
would Weyerhaeuser’s production of finished lumber. But
Weyerhaeuser would make sufficient profits from reducing its input
prices that dropping sales of lumber would be profitable for it.
Competition over inputs is a critical way in which we organize
production in the most efficient possible fashion. At the market price,
a firm that wishes to purchase more of the input needs to offer a
higher price. Doing so will lead to greater supply of that input, but
also may cause a less efficient user of the input to reduce its use if it
can’t make money facing higher input prices. Input prices therefore
serve as the medium we use to allocate production away from less
efficient firms towards more efficient ones. This also means that we
will see a standard pattern in these cases, where less efficient firms will
have strong incentives to complain about the tactics being used by
more efficient competitors.

16 Id at 1073.
17 Although the Court recognized that predatory bidding could lead to market power
in both the input market and the output market, id at 1076 n 2, the case appears to have
been litigated on the premise that Weyerhaeuser was not seeking market power in the
finished lumber market.
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The District Court presented the jury with the following
instruction. Weyerhaeuser behaved anti-competitively if it “purchased
more logs than it needed, or paid a higher price for logs than
necessary, in order to prevent [Ross-Simmons] from obtaining the
logs they needed at a fair price.”18 The appearance of the f-word
should almost always make us nervous, but here we can probably
offer an interpretation more congenial to economics. Presumably the
notion of a “fair” price was intended to capture a price unaffected by
the alleged predatory behavior.
Focus on how the jury instruction operates in practice.
Weyerhaeuser buys more sawlogs. What does it do with them?
Weyerhaeuser either sticks them in its inventory or processes them
and converts them into finished lumber. If it inventories a sawlog, it
incurs a cost but no revenue. If it processes it, it then sells the finished
lumber and we can calculate profits or losses. “Purchase more logs
than it needed” sounds like Weyerhaeuser was stockpiling sawlogs.
Weyerhaeuser presumably has some inventory of sawlogs, but under
Ross-Simmons’s theory Weyerhaeuser’s inventory should have been
growing as it was trying to cut off Ross-Simmons’s supply of logs by
cornering the market. Attempts to corner the market are highly
dependent on the elasticity of supply, as the Hunt brothers were
dismayed to learn in their 1980s attempt to corner the silver market,
though everyone agrees that the supply of red alder sawlogs—which
take many years to grow—is relatively inelastic in the short run.
Confronted with this situation, the Court did exactly what we
should have anticipated. In its predatory pricing cases, the Court has
made clear that we should be particularly concerned about antitrust
doctrine that interferes with the key levers of competition that
routinely produce benefits for consumers.19 Lowering prices is almost
always good for consumers, and we should be nervous about the

18 Id at 1073.
19 Brooke Group, 509 US at 223.
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possibility that the fear of antitrust liability will cause even a
moment’s hesitation about lowering a price. Brooke Group established
a two-part test for predatory pricing. First, prices must be shown to
be below cost. What cost? The Supreme Court won’t tell us—“we
again decline to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the
appropriate measure of cost”20—but presumably we are talking about
marginal cost, or, perhaps more accessibly as in Brooke Group itself,
average variable cost. With below-cost pricing made out, we turn to
the second prong, which requires “a demonstration that the
competitor has a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in belowcost prices.”21
In the predatory bidding context at stake in Weyerhaeuser,
consumers benefit from the competition among efficient and lessefficient producers. Inefficient producers lead to higher prices and
consumers should want those producers driven from the market by
more efficient producers. Consumers want competition and want
that output produced by the most efficient producers. The jury
instruction in Weyerhaeuser threatened to interfere with that process
by punting a question about fairness to the jury, and it is hard to
imagine an instruction that would strike more fear into the heart of a
producer competing for inputs. The Court recognized that and
moved to simplify antitrust doctrine by synchronizing the tests for
predatory pricing and predatory bidding by applying the Brooke
Group test to both cases.22
20 Id 222 n 1.
21 Id at 224.
22 For additional commentary on Weyerhaeuser, see John B. Kirkwood, Controlling

above-cost predation: an alternative to Weyerhaeuser and Brooke Group, (unpublished
manuscript, 2007), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027261
(visited Jan 16, 2008); Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding and Error Costs
(Boston University School of Law Working Paper No 08-03, 2008), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084106 (visited Jan 24, 2008) (arguing
that there are distinctions between predatory bidding and predatory pricing but that
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II. CREDIT SUISSE: MOVING COMPETITION POLICY TO
AGENCIES
Two federal statutes might apply to the conduct in question: how are
we to determine which applies? In some cases, Congress may address
this directly by including an antitrust “savings” clause, as it did in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.23 That doesn’t mean, of course,
that there won’t be messy cases,24 but at least Congress, as author of
both federal statutes, will have made clear its plan for how the statutes
should work together. But if Congress hasn’t addressed this directly,
what should we do? This isn’t a question specific to antitrust nor is it
a new question for antitrust—we faced this question in trying to
mesh together the interstate Commerce Act, passed in 1887, and the
Sherman Act (passed in 1890)25—but it is the issue in Credit Suisse.
In January, 2002 a group of investors sued ten investment banks
alleging that their sales practices for initial public offerings (IPOs)
violated the antitrust laws. The complaint stated that the
commissions earned by the investment banks were being established
noncompetitively, that investors were being forced to buy less
attractive IPOs to get access to the really good ones—a tying claim—
and that investors were being forced to promise to place bids in the

concerns about court mistakes justify applying the Brooke Group doctrine to cover both);
Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust’s Holy Grail, 2006-2007 Cato
S Ct Rev 277 (arguing that Weyerhaeuser implicitly addresses the circumstances under which
a more efficient rival can be excluded consistent with Section 2 of the Sherman Act);
Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light
(unpublished
manuscript,
2007),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975992 (visited Jan 16, 2008).
23 The note following 47 USC § 152 provides that “[n]othing in this Act or the

amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”
24 See Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398

(2004).
25 United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 290 (1897); Carlton and
Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (cited in note 14).
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aftermarket after the IPO at prices higher than the IPO price (socalled laddering). The investment banks moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the federal securities laws barred the
antitrust claims. The district court did so, but the Second Circuit
reversed, and that took the case to the Supreme Court.
Justice Breyer, along with five other justices, concluded that the
securities laws were “clearly incompatible” with the antitrust laws in
these circumstances. Justice Kennedy didn’t participate; Justice
Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment; and
Justice Thomas dissented. We might start with Justice Thomas’s
dissent. He noted that the Court had framed Credit Suisse as a case of
whether the securities laws “implicitly” precluded application of the
antitrust laws. Of course, implicit preclusion arises only if the federal
statute doesn’t address the matter explicitly. What do the securities
laws say?
The 1933 and 1934 securities laws provided rights that were to
be “in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that [might]
exist in law or in equity”26 and therefore presumably in addition to
the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act (1914) and the Federal
Trade Commission Act (1914). So the core antitrust principles
continue to apply and the Second Circuit was right to allow the IPO
antitrust lawsuit to move forward. Next case. But Justice Thomas’s
position faced two hurdles. The Court majority believed that Justice
Thomas’s argument hadn’t been presented below. Moreover, the
argument was inconsistent with how the Court had approached the
question of implicit preclusion in its prior cases in the area, in
particular in Gordon and NASD.27 All of that allowed the Court to
move forward with its analysis of implicit preclusion, but also
suggests that these issues will be argued differently the next time the

26 15 USC §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a).
27 Gordon v New York Stock Exchange, Inc, 422 US 659 (1975) and United States v
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc, 422 US 694 (1975).
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Court confronts a possible conflict between the securities laws and
antitrust.
Justice Breyer synthesized Gordon and NASD as turning on four
considerations. He focused on “(1) the existence of regulatory
authority under the securities law to supervise the activities in
question; (2) evidence that responsible regulatory entities exercise that
authority; and (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust
laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance,
requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct.” He added
that the analysis should also consider whether the practices in
question “lie squarely within an area of financial market activity that
the securities laws seek to regulate.”28
With this test in hand, the Court set off on relatively brief and
unremarkable examination of the regulations that control initial
public offerings. This is an area of extensive oversight by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Indeed, a central purpose in
passing the 1933 and 1934 securities acts and creating the SEC was
to create a substantial regulatory apparatus to control IPOs. The SEC
has broad regulatory authority over IPOs and exercises it extensively.
That is true generally but also true with regard to the IPO
underwriting syndicates challenged in the original complaint in this
case. As the Court emphasized, the SEC draws exceedingly fine lines
between the allowed and the forbidden, which in turn created a
severe risk that courts acting on antitrust lawsuits will interfere with
the authority of the SEC.
In its two most recent cases at the intersection of antitrust and
regulation—Trinko and Credit Suisse—the Court has shown a high
level of deference in favor of the regulatory scheme and in limiting
the application of the antitrust laws. With regulations generally
receiving a high level of deference under the Chevron doctrine, Trinko
and Credit Suisse represent push towards entrusting competition

28 Credit Suisse, 127 S Ct at 2392.
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policy to specialized regulators. At a minimum, that shifts control
over chunks of competition policy from courts to agencies, but it is
probably a shift in emphasis as well. Specialized regulators will
typically weigh competition policy as just one factor among many
and, compared against a baseline of court-enforced antitrust law, this
almost certainly represents a step back for the role of competition
policy in these regulated industries.29
III. TWOMBLY: HOW DO YOU PLEAD WHAT YOU DON’T
KNOW?
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that
the mere assertion in a complaint of an underlying agreement
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act was insufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss when the parallel behavior in question could just as
easily be explained as independent behavior. The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Souter, emphasized the high costs associated with
antitrust discovery. In reaching its conclusion, the Court “retired”—
as it put it—its 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson, had embraced “the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.”30 Twombly will be asserted routinely in efforts to dismiss
antitrust complaints, and it may have broad effects outside of
antitrust as well.31
Twombly focuses on the pleading requirements established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular, that staple of

29 For additional commentary on Credit Suisse, see Keith Sharfman, Credit Suisse,

Regulatory Immunity, and the Shrinking Scope of Antitrust (unpublished manuscript, 2007),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997405 (visited Jan 16, 2008).
30 Bell Atlantic Corp, 127 S Ct at 1968.
31 For additional commentary on Twombly, see Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards after
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 Va L Rev in Brief 121 (2007) (online at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf) (visited Jan 16, 2008).
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first-year civil procedure, Rule 8 of the FCRP. That rule requires that
a pleading set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”32 What might that look like?
Generations of students have considered Form 9 and especially its
second sentence: “On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently
drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway”33 That is all it says. Nothing about how the car was being
driven—too fast? swerving?—just where and when and only one
more word—“negligently.”
What does all of that tell us about the complaint in Twombly?
The oral argument focused on Paragraph 51 of the complaint.34 That
paragraph alleged:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between
the RBOCs in one another’s markets, and in light of the
parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the
other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs
allege upon information and belief that Defendants have
entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
entry in their respective local telephone and/or high speed
internet service markets and have agreed not to compete with
one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets
to one another.35
If you don’t speak telephonese, “RBOCs” are the Regional Bell
Operating Companies, meaning, to again search for English, the local

32 FRCP 8.
33 FRCP Form 9.
34 Oral Argument Transcript, Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, No 05-1126, *3, 22, 41
(Nov 27, 2006).
35 Bell Atlantic Corp, 127 S Ct at 1970 n 10.
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phone companies that emerged from the break-up of the original
AT&T, while a “CLEC” is a competitive local exchange carrier,
meaning a new entrant into the landline phone market. The core
allegation is one of market division: you take the East, I’ll take the
West, and we won’t compete with each other. Market division is one
of the dwindling number of per se violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.36
Of course, a plaintiff actually has to prove that Section 1 of the
Sherman Act was violated, that is, that there actually was a contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Independent parallel
behavior isn’t enough—even if the defendants are watching each
other quite carefully. Paragraph 51 of the complaint alleges parallel
behavior—the RBOCs have not entered each other’s markets—and
then—giant puff of smoke and POOF—agreement. We are given no
facts of the agreement—where and when and what brands of cigars
were being smoked in the proverbial smoke-filled room?—but just a
bald assertion that an agreement exists. Other parts of the complaint
try to make out why the RBOCs should have entered and why not
entering was against their own interests, but there is ultimately little
more than an allegation of parallel behavior and then a claim of
agreement.
Even prior to Twombly, it was clear that more than that would be
required at trial to win an antitrust case. The Supreme Court’s 1976
decision in Matsushita requires that “[t]o survive a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that tends to
exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted
independently.”37 We will not just let juries flip coins: if the plaintiff
can’t do more than just assert agreement, if the plaintiff can’t with
evidence exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting
36 United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596 (1972).
37 Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co, 475 US at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite
Service Corp, 465 US 752 (1984)).
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independently, the plaintiff loses, and indeed, the judge must not let
the case go to the jury.
But Matsushita’s standard was announced in the context of
summary judgment, after the plaintiff had had the opportunity to
conduct discovery. What should we insist upon at the time that the
complaint is filed? Return to Form 9 and focus on who knows what
and what Form 9 tells us about the role of information asymmetry—
what I know that you don’t know—in pleading. Many of the core
facts of the accident are known equally to both parties: the date, the
location, the fact that a car struck a pedestrian. Presumably, both the
plaintiff and the defendant have equal access to that information, and
Form 9 seems to require that the plaintiff plead the facts known to
her so as to give notice of the claim alleged.
But one set of facts isn’t well-known to the plaintiff, that is,
exactly how the car was driven. Was the driver yakking away on his
cell phone and not paying sufficient attention? Did the driver have a
child in the back seat and turn at just the wrong moment to hand
back a sippy cup? We don’t know and neither does the plaintiff. That
is the key point. Form 9 tells the plaintiff to plead the facts that she
can know before she undertakes discovery. She does exactly that in
Form 9. But she can’t know the underlying facts that would give rise
to a finding of negligence, and, as to that, Form 9 lets the plaintiff
assert—in just one word—that the car was driven “negligently.”
Justifying that at trial will require more facts, facts that the plaintiff
does not have access to when the complaint is filed, facts that will
have to emerge through the process of discovery and trial.
Discovery lets the plaintiff get at the underlying facts that are not
available to her when the complaint is drafted and lets her move
beyond an uninformative assertion of legal liability—“negligently,” as
Form 9 puts it—to proof of the underlying facts that demonstrate
liability—that the driver was reaching for a sippy cup when the
accident occurred. That evidence is initially available only to the
defendant, and the lesson of Form 9 is that while we make plaintiffs
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plead the facts that are available to them without discovery, we don’t
make plaintiffs plead facts that are available only to the defendant.
The majority opinion in Twombly makes very little of this. Form
9 is discussed in footnote 10 of the majority opinion:
Apart from identifying a seven-year span in which the §1
violations were supposed to have occurred ..., the pleadings
mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the
alleged conspiracies. This lack of notice contrasts sharply with the
model form for pleading negligence, Form 9, which the dissent
says exemplifies the kind of “bare allegation” that survives a
motion to dismiss. … Whereas the model form alleges that the
defendant struck the plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was
crossing a particular highway at a specified date and time, the
complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four ILECs
(much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when
and where the illicit agreement took place. A defendant wishing
to prepare an answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9
would know what to answer; a defendant seeking to respond to
plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations in the §1 context would have
little idea where to begin.
This discussion misses a number of crucial points. We should first
put the “answer” problem to one side. As a look at any recently-filed
answer makes clear, we know how the defendant is going to answer:
the defendant is simply going to deny the allegation. Focus instead on
what Form 9 says. As Justice Stevens notes in his dissenting opinion,
the bare allegation of negligence in Form 9 would have been a
conclusion of law under old-school pleading.38 But it is exactly what
Form 9 contemplates and nothing in the word “negligence” gives the
defendant any specific sense of the negligence alleged. It is asserted,
with nothing more. Footnote 10 of the majority opinion skips over
this entirely in emphasizing that the plaintiff in the Form 9 exemplar

38 Bell Atlantic Corp, 127 S Ct at 1977.
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lists many facts. Yes, indeed; probably all of the facts known to the
plaintiff, but nothing about how the car was driven—something
unknown to the plaintiff—other than that it was driven
“negligently.”
If we turn back to antitrust, the assertion of negligence in Form 9
is no less bare than the standard assertion of the existence of a
conspiracy in an antitrust complaint. The problem, of course, is the
one-sidedness of the information available on the existence (or nonexistence) of a conspiracy, a point that Justice Stevens emphasizes in
his dissent.39 Often the plaintiffs won’t be able to get at the facts of
conspiracy—the who, what when and where contemplated by
footnote 10 of the majority opinion—without discovery.
Of course in both cases—in Form 9 and the complaint in
Twombly—the plaintiffs make a critical assertion—negligence in
Form 9 and a contract, combination or conspiracy in paragraph 51 of
the Twombly complaint—and it isn’t obvious on what basis the
assertion is made. Paragraph 51 does little more than parrot the
language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Does Rule 8 require no
more than a simple assertion that Section 1 has been violated (“On
information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act”)? In the world of Form 9, the accident
itself allegedly has taken place and perhaps that alone is enough, if we
assume that most accidents arise from some sort of wrong. In
contrast, paragraph 51 focuses on the absence of entry into markets,
and that absence might arise from illegal agreement or from countless
other causes. The Twombly complaint offers little more than the
plaintiff’s belief that such an agreement exists and will be confirmed
only if discovery is permitted.
And remember that FRCP 11 provides that the attorney’s
signature on the complaint acts as a representation to the court that
to the best of the attorney’s information and belief the assertion of an

39 Id at 1983.
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agreement “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” If the attorney
can’t specify any of that evidentiary support in drafting the
complaint, how can she sign the pleading and comply with Rule 11?
For the experienced attorney, the likely existence of agreement might
be just as self-evident as the likely existence of negligence in the
accident in Form 9.
So we face something of a conundrum, almost certainly wanting a
pleading system that demands more than just “they violated Section
1” and yet recognizing that the relevant information about liability
will be systematically more available to one side than the other. A
central point of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—rules
controlled by the Supreme Court—is to figure out exactly how to
manage that one-sidedness. The critical question isn’t how to frame
the answer—those rules will track the leniency or severity of our rules
for framing the complaint—but rather how to frame discovery, and
more generally, how to manage the one-sidedness of information. It
is the fear of discovery run amok that drives the majority opinion,40
but the Court offers no guidance as to how matters might be
improved.
It is hard to imagine an area that the Court controls more
completely. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the rules of civil
procedure are squarely in the Supreme Court’s hands.41 If the current
discovery rules don’t work—in antitrust cases or other cases—the
Court should fix them. This is a problem of institutional design
entrusted to the Court by Congress. The opinion in Twombly acts as
if the discovery rules come from Mars rather than from the Supreme
Court itself. The Court majority is correctly concerned that vague
complaints can be used as fishing expeditions, though note that the
plaintiff proposed phased discovery starting with whether an

40 Id at 1967-68 n 6.
41 28 USC § 2072(a).
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agreement existed. If the Court believes that district court judges
can’t be trusted to manage discovery or that sensible rules cannot be
crafted, it should say so. Maybe, in fact, that is effectively what
Twombly says.
Note where that puts us. Antitrust laws are enforced through a
mix of private and public efforts. Twombly limits the efficacy of
private lawsuits. The Court majority does not seem to recognize the
fundamental problem that the critical information regarding the
existence or nonexistence of a possible conspiracy resides in the hands
of potential defendants. Private litigation substitutes, at least in part,
for public enforcement or regulation. The federal government has
broad, but not unlimited, authority to serve civil investigative
demands (CIDs) prior to bringing an antitrust action.42 Twombly
shrinks the domain of private plaintiffs and it does so without even a
passing thought about what that will do to the overall level of
antitrust enforcement.
IV. LEEGIN: STATUTORY STARE DECISIS FOR STRATEGIC
JUDGES
The decision in Leegin was announced on June 28, 2007, the last day
of the 2006 Term. Leegin brings to a close a nearly 100-year saga of
minimum resale price maintenance. That story is worth telling on its
own, but the case also reveals sharp fault lines over the role of stare
decisis in antitrust.43
42 15 USC § 1312.
43 For additional commentary on Leegin, see Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr. Miles?
(unpublished
manuscript,
2007),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009972) (visited Jan 16, 2008);
Shubha Ghosh, Vertical Restraints, Competition and the Rule of Reason, (unpublished
manuscript, 2007), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005380)
(visited Jan 16, 2008); Lino A. Graglia, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.:
The Strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Maintenance (University of Texas Law and
Economics
Research
Paper
No
115,
Nov
2007,
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028562 (visited Jan 16, 2008)
(“Strange Career”); Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices,
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A. MINIMUM RPM: FROM DR. MILES AND COLGATE TO LEEGIN

The antitrust statutes say very little on their own. Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act set out only the most basic framework and thus
much of the actual practice under the statute arises through judgemade interpretations of the broad phrases of those sections. Section 1
applies to joint activity—”every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade”—while Section
2 applies to single-firm activity—monopolization. Antitrust law is
common law, that is, judge made law in which courts revisit recurring
fact patterns. In that framework, the job of the Supreme Court is to
establish rules that can be implemented by lower courts and which in
turn can guide economic activity. And, for the joint activities reached
by Section 1, the heart of that analysis over the last century has been
the division of particular practices into those that are per se illegal—
known to be illegal without extensive consideration or fact-finding in
a particular case—and those that must receive more considered
attention under the rule of reason.
Section 1 always has been and remains most concerned about
horizontal practices, meaning those among firms that are direct
competitors. And within that group, horizontal price-fixing has been
the most pernicious practice of all.44 But contracts among
(Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No 07-25, Jan 2008), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1033440 (visited Jan 16, 2008); Ittai
Paldor, Rethinking RPM: Did the Courts Have It Right All Along?, (unpublished SJD
dissertation,
University
of
Toronto,
2007),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=994750 (visited Jan 16, 2008).
44 United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150, 224 n 59 (1940) (“Price-fixing
agreements may or may not be aimed at complete elimination of price competition. The
group making those agreements may or may not have power to control the market. But the
fact that the group cannot control the market prices does not necessarily mean that the
agreement as to prices has no utility to the members of the combination. The effectiveness of
price-fixing agreements is dependent on many factors, such as competitive tactics, position in
the industry, the formula underlying price policies. Whatever economic justification
particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an
inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential
threat to the central nervous system of the economy.”); United States v Trenton Potteries Co,
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competitors are often artificial: the leading retailers of the day don’t
usually deal directly with each other. But retailers contract with
manufacturers all of the time, or, perhaps with wholesalers who in
turn have agreements with manufacturers. These sorts of vertical
contracts will arise perfectly naturally unless manufacturers fully
vertically integrate, meaning that Kellogg not only produces cereal in
Battle Creek, Michigan but that it sets up Kellogg stores across the
land to sell its cereal directly to consumers. We know that to be quite
unusual, which suggests that there are frequently economies of scale
and scope in retailing. It is more efficient to bring together Kellogg’s
many different brands along with those of General Mills and others,
and add also milk, sugar, fruit—things that might go into a bowl of
cereal—along with thousands of other products in a modern grocery
store.
How should Section 1 approach these necessary vertical
transactions? In 1911, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.,45 the Court put in place a rule that would last nearly a
century. Dr. Miles sold proprietary medicines through a network of
dealers. One level down it entered into what it denominated as
“Consignment Contracts—Wholesale.” Consignees in turn were
expected to deal with retailers who in turn sold to the public. And the
retailers themselves entered into direct “Retail Agency Contracts”
with Dr. Miles. So as Dr. Miles’s potions traveled down the chain of
commerce each transfer prior to sale to the general public was to be
made to a party in a direct contract with Dr. Miles.
The consignment contract between Dr. Miles and its wholesalers
seemed to contemplate that title in the medicines would remain with
Dr. Miles even though possession had been transferred to the
wholesaler. Put differently, the consignment contract was an agency
contract making it possible for Dr. Miles as principal to direct how its
agent wholesalers would act. The majority opinion in Dr. Miles seems
273 US 392 (1927).
45 220 US 373 (1911).
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to waffle on this a bit based on some sloppy statements made by the
plaintiff to the Court, but Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion
appropriately saw no reason to do anything other than give the
consignment contract is most natural reading.46
Dr. Miles wanted to use its continuing control over title to allow
it to set the prices which the medicines would be sold by wholesalers
to retailers. The contract specified minimum sales prices, meaning
that wholesalers could sell to retailers on Dr. Miles’s behalf for a price
not less than the specified contractual price. But Dr. Miles wanted to
control not just wholesale prices—the prices paid by retailers to Dr.
Miles—just as it would as if it acted without wholesalers, but also
retail prices, meaning the prices paid by consumers to retailers. Again,
Dr. Miles could have done that had it run only a mail-order business,
and it wanted to achieve that same control over prices while operating
through intermediaries. Thus, the retail agency contracts specified
minimum sales prices as well.
But, and now we get to legal niceties, the retail agency contracts
seemed to contemplate that the retailer actually purchased the
medicines and then resold them to its customers. So when possession
passed from Dr. Miles to its wholesalers, title didn’t pass, but when
possession passed from a wholesaler to a retailer, title passed as well.
In the agency contract and notwithstanding the passing of title, the
retailer agreed that it wouldn’t sell at less than the full retail price as
printed on the packages by Dr. Miles. So we have the passage of title
and then a separate promise about the sales prices for the goods then
owned by retailers.
When a former wholesaler of Dr. Miles outside the network of
contracts bought from current consignee wholesalers and retailers
within the contracts and then sold for less than the full retail price,
46 Dr. Miles, 220 US at 409-410 (“That they are agents, and not buyers, I understand
to be conceded, and I do not see how it can be denied. We have nothing before us but the
form and the alleged effect of the written instrument, and they are both express that the title
to the goods is to remain in the plaintiff until actual sale is permitted by the contract”).
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Dr. Miles sued alleging tortuous interference with contract and
fraudulent dealing. That put the above contractual arrangements in
front of the Court. The Court saw two problems. First, restraints on
alienation were generally invalid, and the contracts in issue didn’t fall
within the narrow class of contracts excepted from that general rule.47
Second, the Court understood Section 1 of the Sherman Act to
condemn price fixing and saw that the contractual arrangements
prevented price competition just as much as would a purely
horizontal agreement among retailers.48 That a manufacturer could
choose not to sell at all or could choose not to sell through others was
irrelevant; if the manufacturer chose to sell to retailers who then sold
to consumers, the manufacturer had to accept whatever legal burdens
came with its distribution choice.
But the Court complicated the analysis in Dr. Miles with its 1919
decision in Colgate.49 Colgate had been indicted for forming a
combination to fix resale prices by preventing its wholesale and retail
dealers from selling below the minimum prices set by Colgate. Put
that way, this seems like an easy case under Dr. Miles, and so the
government argued to the Court. But confronted with a rather
tangled district court opinion50 and, as Lino Graglia has noted, with
the guidance of former Justice Charles Hughes, the author of the Dr.
Miles opinion who had since left the Court and then returned as an
advocate (after running for President!),51 the Court pieced together a
47 Id at 404-07.
48 Id at 408 (“As to this, the complainant can fare no better than could the dealers
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions,
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other”).
49 United States v Colgate, 250 US 300 (1919).
50 Under the Criminal Appeals Act, the United States was allowed to take a direct

appeal to the Court from the district court “from a decision or judgment quashing, setting
aside, or sustaining a demurrer to, any indictment, or any count thereof, where such decision
or judgment is based upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the
indictment is founded.” Act March 2, 1907, 34 Stat 1246.
51 Graglia, Strange Career at 12 (cited in note 43).
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different story. On the one hand, Colgate was said to enter into no
contracts with its dealers, but on the other, Colgate had combined
with them and received their “assurances and promises” regarding the
required minimum prices. The Court expressed “serious doubts”
about what to make of all of that, but thought that the best
understanding of the case was that Colgate had done no more than
exercise its recognized right to choose not to deal with anyone,
including the right not to deal with any person who had sold at a
price below those announced by Colgate. Unilateral action regarding
minimum retail prices didn’t violate the joint action requirement of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Colgate), while joint action on the
same did (Dr. Miles).52 A manufacturer implementing Colgate-style
minimum RPM might face liability under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which reaches unilateral actions, but Section 2 requires
monopolization and not just the market power that suffices for a
violation of Section 1.
It didn’t take long for the Court to confront the difficulties of
separating Dr. Miles and Colgate, with the Court returning to the
question repeatedly in Schrader’s Son (1920), Frey & Son (1921),
Beech-Nut (1922) and General Electric (1926).53 In Schrader’s Son, the
Court quoted extensively from the district court’s opinion on the
“distinction without a difference” between Colgate and Dr. Miles,
before dismissing that analysis given the “obvious difference” between

52 As the Court put it, “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.” As for Dr. Miles, “the unlawful
combination was effected through contracts which undertook to prevent dealers from freely
exercising the right to sell.” Colgate, 250 US at 307-08.
53 United States v A. Schrader’s Son, Inc, 252 US 85 (1920); Frey & Son, Inc v Cudahy
Packing Co, 256 US 208 (1921); Federal Trade Commission v Beech-Nut Packing Co, 257 US
441 (1922); United States v General Electric Co, 272 US 426 (1926).
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the situations presented.54 Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented
without opinion. In Frey & Son, a private antitrust action was
brought under Dr. Miles seeking damages and a jury verdict was
returned in favor of the plaintiff. In a 6-3 decision, the Court
concluded that the Fourth Circuit had misunderstood Colgate and
Schrader’s Son in reversing the district court, but that the district
court too had misunderstood Colgate in formulating the key jury
instruction.
Beech-Nut added a new wrinkle, as the Federal Trade
Commission initiated an action against minimum RPM under its
authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
condemn unfair methods of competition. The Second Circuit once
again tried to navigate Dr. Miles and Colgate. It understood Dr. Miles
to turn on the existence of an agreement in writing, while in BeechNut, there was no more than a tacit understanding regarding BeechNut’s desire for minimum resale prices and the likely consequences if
dealers failed to meet those prices. The Second Circuit thus
understood the Beech Nut plan to be protected under Colgate.55 Not
so, said the Court, in a 5-4 decision, with both Justices Holmes and
Brandeis siding with the dissenters. Written contracts of the sort used
in Dr. Miles were not required, and indeed the FTC had found none
in its consideration of Beech-Nut’s sales program. Instead, a course of
dealing would suffice to show a combination, so long as that dealing
established more than just the mere refusal to sell protected under
Colgate. Of course, Colgate itself involved more than just a naked
refusal to sell, but the majority didn’t dwell on that point. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes noted that whatever one might
think generally about permitted vertical arrangements, the Federal
Trade Commission faced the greater burden of showing that the
practice in question was an “unfair” method of competition, and that

54 A. Schrader’s Son, Inc, 252 US at 99.
55 Beech-Nut Packing Co, 257 US at 451.
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it could hardly be unfair for a manufacturer to control the extent to
which its own goods competed with themselves.56
Finally, in General Electric, the Court held that if a manufacturer
entered into genuine agency contracts with wholesalers and retailers,
the manufacturer could establish final-market sales prices for its goods
(incandescent light bulbs in this case). The government pressed Dr.
Miles, but the Court found that case to be one of true sales dressed up
as agency, whereas General Electric’s contracts created genuine
agents.
Think of Dr. Miles (1911) through General Electric (1926) as the
first key window for the Court on minimum resale price
maintenance. Jump forward to consider a second key window, say
one defined by Parke, Davis (1960) to Sylvania (1977). With the
Court’s 1960 decision in Parke, Davis, Colgate hung by a thread, if
that.57 In a delicious irony, the Court had worked its way up from
the snake-oil medicines of Dr. Miles to the modern pharmaceuticals
of Parke, Davis, once the world’s largest drugmaker.58 Pursuant to
what it understood to be its rights under Colgate, Parke had used its
wholesale and resale catalogues to announce a minimum RPM policy.
It did so only after consulting counsel who emphasized the need to
proceed unilaterally and without agreement, thereby navigating
between Colgate and Dr. Miles.59 In the Court’s view, Parke had
overstepped the Colgate line when it sent to wholesalers the names of
retailers who were no longer to receive Parke’s products. But for the
three dissenting justices (Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker), the
56 Id at 457 (“And to come back to the words of the statute I cannot see how it is
unfair competition to say to those to whom the respondent sells and to the world, you can
have my goods only on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any competition in
dealing with them depends upon the respondent’s will. I see no wrong in so doing, and if I
did I should not think that it is a wrong within the possible scope of the word unfair”).
57 United States v Parke, Davis and Co, 362 US 29 (1960).
58
For
discussion
of
Parke,
Davis’s
http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/pfizer_warner_lambert.jsp.

history,

see

59 Parke, Davis, 362 US at 33.
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Court had sent Colgate to its “demise.” purporting to “profess respect
for Colgate and eviscerate it in application.”60
But if Parke, Davis turned Colgate into a zombie—condemned to
live among the walking dead—it also had the consequence of pushing
manufacturers away from vertical price restraints and towards
nonprice vertical restraints. That in turn led to the Court’s landmark
1977 decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.61 which
ended more than a decade of per se ping pong and established a new
framework for evaluating certain nonprice vertical restraints. And,
though it took three decades, the path from Sylvania to Leegin was
reasonably clear, as Justice White’s concurring opinion in Sylvania
recognized in 1977.
We should start with the Court’s 1963 decision in White Motor.62
In a 5-3 decision, the Court declined to find that territorial
restrictions in vertical arrangements—a truck manufacturer defining
territories for its dealers—were per se illegal.63 The Court distinguish
price-fixing agreement—both the horizontal agreements at the heart
of the Sherman Act and the vertical agreements condemned by Dr.
Miles—but believed it had too little information to assess the actual
effects of dealer territories. A trial was required to create a richer
record for evaluation.
But four years later, the Court took a different path in its decision
in Schwinn.64 In a case argued for the government by Richard Posner,
the Court once again considered dealer territories imposed by a
manufacturer, in this case, the well-known bicycle maker. The Court,
reaching back to its analysis in Dr. Miles and General Electric, turned
the analysis of the vertical territorial restrictions on whether the

60 Id at 49, 57.
61 433 US 36 (1977).
62 White Motor Co v United States, 372 US 253 (1963).
63 Id at. 261, 264
64 United States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co, 388 US 365 (1967).
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manufacturer had passed title to the good down the chain of
distribution. If title was passed, any restraint by the manufacturer was
per se illegal.65 But if the manufacturer retained title, so that its
distributors acted as its agents, the restraint would be evaluated under
the rule of reason, as White Motor contemplated.
Schwinn set a rule for the ages. Actually, Schwinn barely made it a
decade. In Sylvania (1977), the Court overruled Schwinn and
returned nonprice vertical restraints to the rule-of-reason analysis that
had controlled prior to Schwinn.66 Sylvania had re-organized its
distributor program for the TV sets it manufactured and had boosted
its share of the market from 1% to 5%, a still-piddling share against
then-dominant RCA, which had a 70% market share. An unhappy
Sylvania distributor had asserted an antitrust claim against Sylvania
for the territorial limits it had imposed on its franchisees. The Ninth
Circuit struggled to permit the restriction consistent with Schwinn,
but the Supreme Court wouldn’t play that game and instead
overturned Schwinn. The decision wasn’t unanimous: Justices
Brennan and Marshall would have adhered to Schwinn, while Justice
White thought that Schwinn could be distinguished. Justice White
was particularly concerned that the opinion in Sylvania put at risk
Dr. Miles (“[t]he effect, if not the intention, of the Court’s opinion is
necessarily to call into question the firmly established per se rule
against price restraints”).67
It is important to trace the path here. We spent the better part of
four decades—say 1920 to 1960—trying to make Dr. Miles and
Colgate work together. Generations of antitrust lawyers tried to advise
their clients on how to remain on the Colgate side of the line—
unilaterally-imposed minimum RPM—without stepping over the
line into the RPM via contract or combination condemned as illegal

65 Id at 382.
66 Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 58-59 (1977).
67 Id at 70.
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per se by Dr. Miles. The Court’s 1960 decision in Parke, Davis had to
make clear to lawyers that they couldn’t provide reliable advice to
their clients about how to do that. So they switched away from
minimum RPM and moved to nonprice vertical restraints of the sort
seen in White Motor, Schwinn and Sylvania. That set off more
doctrinal churn, but the Court moved through that with reasonable
dispatch—the 14 years between White Motor and Sylvania—and
Sylvania then launched the modern analysis of vertical restraints. We
see the nature of legal innovation at work: if Parke, Davis limited the
practical effect of Colgate, it also gave birth to Sylvania and then
Leegin, and Leegin restored Colgate.
We can move quickly through the balance of the pre-Leegin cases.
The Court’s 1984 opinion in Monsanto is noteworthy for a number
of reasons.68 The Court declined the Solicitor General’s suggestion
that Dr. Miles be reconsidered. At the same time, the Court saw two
key doctrinal framings for considering vertical restraints. The first was
the key distinction between unilateral activity and joint activity—
citing to Colgate and Parke, Davis (really?)—while the second was the
line between price and nonprice vertical restraints, that is, the line
between the per se illegality of contractual minimum RPM in Dr.
Miles and the rule-of-reason analysis of nonprice restraints in
Sylvania. Monsanto serves as a natural baseline for assessing recent
Supreme Court approaches to stare decisis in antitrust. Finally, in
1997, in State Oil Co v. Kahn, the Court overturned its 1968 Albrecht
decision to move maximum retail price maintenance into the rule-ofreason category. Albrecht is interesting in its own right for the way it
approached the meaning of “combination” in Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, but after State Oil, maximum RPM would be evaluated
under the rule of reason.69

68 Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp, 465 US 752 (1984).
69 State Oil Co v. Kahn, 522 US 3 (1997).
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Together, Sylvania, Monsanto and State Oil set the stage for
Leegin. Nonprice vertical restraints receive rule of reason treatment
under Sylvania. Monsanto suggests that Colgate still matters,
notwithstanding Parke, Davis, and that unilateral minimum RPM is
free of Section 1 scrutiny. State Oil establishes that contractual
maximum RPM was to be evaluated under the rule of reason. As we
sliced and diced the vertical restraints space that seemed to leave us
only with contractual minimum RPM, which remained per se illegal
under Dr. Miles. Until Leegin.
B. THE OPINIONS IN LEEGIN

Leegin is a small maker of women’s leather belts. Leegin’s revenues
had been flat for most of the 1980s—hovering around $10 million in
annual revenues—but then its growth rapidly accelerated from $15
million in 1988 to $20 million in 1989 and then to $47 million in
1992.70 The leather belt market is the ultimate old-economy business:
it takes little more than a dead cow to enter the business and the
overall market is almost certainly quite competitive.
Leegin sells women’s belts under its Brighton brand and does so
in more than 5,000 small stores across the country. One of these was
Kay’s Kloset, a small women’s clothing store in the Dallas suburbs,
run by Phil Smith and his wife Kay since 1986. Leegin moved to
contractual minimum resale price maintenance in 1997 when it
started its “Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy.”71 Leegin’s
letter to retailers describing the policy emphasized that it was seeking
to avoid what it saw as the poor quality of service of “mega stores like
Macy’s, Bloomingdales, May Co. and others” and instead wanted to
partner with small specialty stores offering “great looking stores
selling our products in a quality manner.”72
70 See John Case, A Business Transformed: How one CEO transformed his entire company
in order to make its service indispensable to its customers, Inc. Magazine (June, 1993).
71 Leegin Creative Leather Products, 127 S Ct at 2711.
72 Id.
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In December, 2002, Leegin learned that Kay’s Kloset was
discounting the Brighton brand. The opinion doesn’t say when that
discounting had started, but Phil Smith’s account suggests that it
started after September 11, 2001. Leegin had started offering
discounts to airline and airport employees at a store at the Dallas/Fort
Worth airport, and Kay’s Kloset matched those prices.73 But Leegin
cut off Kay’s Kloset after it refused to sell at the minimum retail
prices and that in turn led to the antitrust lawsuit by Kay’s against
Leegin.
Leegin is really a two-issue case: (1) as a matter of first
consideration, should contractual minimum RPM be treated as per se
illegal or should it instead receive rule-of-reason treatment?; and (2) if
rule-of-reason treatment is appropriate, should the Court nonetheless
adhere to the result of per se illegality established in Dr. Miles? On
the first issue, the Court returned to 1628, the date of Coke upon
Littleton, which Dr. Miles cited for the general proposition that
restraints on alienation were invalid. The Court seemed skeptical that
a nearly 300-year old analysis should have sufficed in 1911 and saw
no basis for that nearly a century later (“[t]he general restraint on
alienation … tended to evoke policy concerns extraneous to the
question that controls here”).74
With the analysis in Dr. Miles itself pushed to the side, the Court
then turned to a fresh consideration of the policies at stake in
minimum resale price maintenance. That took the Court to the
defining feature of modern antitrust analysis, namely the role of
economics in understanding how we should evaluate particular
practices. As has been the Court’s pattern in other cases moving
practices away from per se illegality and towards rule-of-reason

73 Maria Halkias, Local Antitrust Fight Goes to D.C., The Dallas Morning News, (Mar,
25, 2007).
74 Leegin Creative Leather Products, 127 S Ct at 2714.
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analysis, the Court cited the extensive literature arguing that
minimum RPM can have procompetitive benefits.75
Minimum RPM shapes interbrand competition, meaning, for
example, competition between different manufacturers of belts.
Minimum RPM is said to, as the Court put it, “encourage[] retailers
to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that
aid the manufacturer’s position as against rival manufacturers.”76
Minimum RPM also expands the mix of price/service combinations.
With a set minimum resale price, retailers will compete over services
instead. Manufacturers who want low prices can have them, while
other manufacturers who believe that higher prices and higher service
are warranted can sustain that combination as well. As to minimum
RPM, Justice Kennedy’s conclusion was clear: “[t]hough each side of
the debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices to say
here that economics literature is replete with procompetitive
justifications for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance.”77
But even if the Court majority believed, as it obviously did, that a
fresh consideration would result in rule-of-reason treatment for
minimum RPM, what about Dr. Miles? Should stare decisis cause the
Court to stay with the good doctor? Justice Kennedy started with the
Court’s history in antitrust. The Sherman Act is effectively a
common-law statute and over the last hundred years the Supreme
Court has steadily moved away from rules of per se illegality towards
the rule of reason. In many cases, it has overturned prior precedent in
doing so, just as it did for maximum RPM in 1997 State Oil and as it
did last term in Independent Ink in overturning the rule that a patent
holder would be presumed to have market power in a tying case.78

75 Id at 2715.
76 Id.
77 Id at 2714.
78 Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28 (2006).
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In considering stare decisis, Justice Kennedy noted the difficulties
of making sense of a world populated by Dr. Miles, Colgate and
Sylvania: “If we were to decide the procompetitive effects of resale
price maintenance were insufficient to overrule Dr. Miles, then cases
such as Colgate and GTE Sylvania themselves would be called into
question.”79 Of course, this isn’t a new point. Justice White had said
much in his concurrence in Sylvania in which he tried to hang on to
Schwinn. But the passing of time may have made more apparent the
costs of trying to make these three cases work together. As Justice
Kennedy emphasized: “[i]n sum, it is a flawed antitrust doctrine that
serves the interests of lawyers—by creating legal distinctions that
operate as traps for the unwary—more than the interests of
consumers—by requiring manufacturers to choose second-best
options to achieve sound business objectives.”80 This a regime you
can like only if you are a hard-line Darwinist—the survival of the
competitors with the fittest lawyers.
That left the Court with two other factors to consider in its
analysis of stare decisis. The first is congressional intent. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act is quite slim, as it was when it was enacted in 1890,
but for nearly forty years, it was substantially more chunky. In 1937,
Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act which added
two extensive provisos to Section 1.81 The first excepted from the
reach of Section 1 contracts providing for minimum resale prices so
long as underlying state law allowed the transaction, as it might under
a so-called fair trade law. The second proviso made clear that the new
exception was not intended to allow horizontal price setting. MillerTydings was the law of the land until 1975, when it was struck from
the statute and Section 1 was returned to its original form.82 So for

79 Leegin Creative Leather Products, 127 S Ct at 2722.
80 Id at 25.
81 50 Stat 693 (1937).
82 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat 801 (Dec 12, 1975).
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forty years, Congress delegated the legality of minimum RPM to the
states, only to reclaim federal authority in 1975. What does this tell
us about the stare decisis status of Dr. Miles?
In the Court’s view, this is a lot of woulda, coulda, shoulda and
the Court makes very little of it. Yes, in passing the 1937 act,
Congress allowed states to jump in and render minimum RPM legal,
and yes, in acting in 1975, Congress took away that authority and
thereby restored the full reach of Dr. Miles. Prior to 1975, Dr. Miles
had no effect in states which had enacted a fair trade act and its bar
was limited to only those states which had not acted. After 1975, Dr.
Miles again applied everywhere. But at no point did Congress limit
the Court’s ability to continue to evolve antitrust doctrine and
Congress certainly didn’t enact Dr. Miles in 1975.
Finally, that leaves the question of the relevance of reliance for
stare decisis in antitrust. As to that, said the Court, actual reliance on
Dr. Miles had to be limited. No one could seriously claim a century’s
worth of reliance, as it was only with the 1975 amendments to
Section 1 that Dr. Miles again applied throughout the nation.
Moreover, the alternatives to contractual minimum RPM—unilateral
minimum RPM and other vertical contracts—necessarily limited the
domain of Dr. Miles. All of that meant, for the Court, that reliance
interests couldn’t justify keeping an inefficient rule. And with that,
after nearly a 100 years, Dr. Miles was gone; contractual minimum
RPM would now be evaluated under the rule of reason.
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg. Leegin came down on the last day of what one guesses had
been a frustrating term for these four justices. When the Court
decided State Oil in 1997 and overturned Albrecht (1968) and
thereby moved maximum RPM from per se illegality to rule-ofreason analysis, the opinion was unanimous. None of the Leegin
dissenters said a peep about the importance of stare decisis in
antitrust. One gets the sense that the dissent in Leegin may have just
been an easy placeholder for a term’s worth of frustration.
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Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion emphasized that, were he
writing on a blank slate, he would have found the question of
whether to apply the rule of reason to minimum RPM difficult. This
turns much on the genuine difficulties of establishing an
administrative rule that meaningfully implements the rule of reason.
Economists may be able to get tenure writing articles that conflict
about the theoretical consequences of minimum RPM, but a district
court judge actually has to make a decision. As Justice Breyer put it:
“… antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate
economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. That is because law,
unlike economics, is an administrative system the effects of which
depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are
applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their
clients.”83 That led Justice Breyer to his conclusion: “[a]nd, if forced
to decide now, at most I might agree that the per se rule should be
slightly modified to allow an exception for the more easily identifiable
and temporary condition of ‘new entry.’”84
Part of this clearly turns on Justice Breyer’s concern that
minimum RPM pushes up prices. Of course, that is almost certainly
right, as the whole point of minimum RPM is to ensure that prices
meet a floor that some retailers would otherwise push beyond. But, as
Justice Scalia emphasized at oral argument, consumers clearly care
about more than just price.85 If higher prices come with better
services, consumers may be happier. Evidence of higher prices,
without more, tells us nothing about how consumers are faring.
Justice Breyer then turned to the question of whether Dr. Miles
should be overruled. His core point was that nothing had changed
recently that would call Dr. Miles into question. The administrative
difficulties of making Dr. Miles and Colgate work together arose as
83 Leegin Creative Leather Products, 127 S Ct at 2729.
84 Id at 2731.
85 Oral Argument Transcript, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, No 06480, *15 (Mar 26, 2007) (“Leegin Transcript”).
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soon as Colgate was decided in 1919, as the Court’s docket over the
next few years made clear. The economic understanding of minimum
RPM hadn’t change recently either, a point Justice Breyer made in
the oral argument by drawing upon a 1966 economics text on
minimum RPM.86
As to stare decisis itself, Justice Breyer started with what he saw as
the most recent learning on the subject, namely Justice Scalia’s then
four-day-old opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life.87 Something more
than antitrust seemed to be stake. Justice Breyer went through a
laundry list of considerations in implementing stare decisis. Stare
decisis applies with greater force (1) in statutory cases than in
constitutional cases; (2) to old mistakes rather than more recent
mistakes; (3) when the regime created by the original decision is
unworkable; (4) when the original decision “unsettled” the law; (5)
when property rights or contract rights are at stake; and finally (6)
when the original law “becomes ‘embedded’ in our ‘national culture.”
For Justice Breyer, each of these factors pointed to preserving Dr.
Miles.
That left Justice Breyer with the dog that didn’t bark, his missing
dissent in State Oil. State Oil was nine zip with our current
dissenters—Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—all silent.
If stare decisis was so important in 1997, why didn’t we hear
something about it then? This point wasn’t lost on Justice Breyer and
he attempted to distinguish State Oil and Leegin—State Oil overruled
Albrecht and only 29 years had passed, while Leegin overruled Dr.
Miles and we are at almost a century—but that is something of an
artificial comparison given the fair trade era—1937-1975—and so we
might focus on 1975 as the date of full restoration of Dr. Miles. With
that date, the Leegin/State Oil comparison is much tougher for Justice
Breyer.

86 Id at *12.
87 Federal Election Commission v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, 127 S Ct 2652 (2007).
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C. THE ECONOMICS OF MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

We should follow the path that the Court did in Leegin, considering
first the structure of the economic argument and then the status of
stare decisis in antitrust. We should start with the core notion behind
minimum RPM. The manufacturer believes that in-person services
need to be provided to best sell its goods at retail. Provision of
services is costly and the manufacturer fears that some retailers will try
to free ride on other retailers, and if each retailer tries that, no one
will provide the required services.
So the classic example of free-riding might arise in the 1988 case
of Business Electronics.88 Calculators were expensive and complicated
back then—and, even today, who has actually mastered Reverse
Polish Notation?89—and needed to be explained in person. The highend electronics store invests in educating its customers and they learn
all about how the calculator works. That of course costs money and
the price for the calculator should reflect that. But once the consumer
understands the calculator, the consumer can buy from the cheaper
place next door. That means the first store incurs costs that it can’t
recover and therefore won’t provide the services. No one provides the
services and the product isn’t sold.
Minimum RPM changes the nature of competition. By
construction, the stores can’t compete on price. Minimum RPM
allows the manufacturer to create a specified gap between the
wholesale price—set directly by the manufacturer in its sales to
retailers—and the retail price. Absent minimum RPM, that
difference floats and is determined by the competition among
retailers. With it fixed, price-competition among retailers will go
away but they should shift their competitive juices in other
directions. Retailers will take other costly actions and in so doing will
88 Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corp, 485 US 717 (1988).
89 Hewlett-Packard started selling calculators using RPN in 1972 and continues to do
so today. See RPN, An Introduction to Reverse Polish Notation (available at
http://www.hp.com/calculators/news/rpn.html).
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compete away the bonus that has been offered to them through the
fixed retail price.
At least so goes the theory. Put this way, there is a clear
clumsiness associated with minimum RPM. Some retailers might
continue to free ride and hope to just make more money.
Alternatively, retailers might spend the margin—the gap between
retail and wholesale prices—but they might take any number of steps
to provide superior services. Some of those might be nice showrooms
or other investments in ambience. Recall that Leegin’s letter
announcing its new RPM policy focused on “great looking stores
selling our products in a quality manner.” Those investments may
benefit the manufacturer providing the minimum RPM bonus, but
many of these investments actually benefit all manufacturers.
No one manufacturer actually wants to invest in ambience; as a
manufacturer, you want all of the other manufacturers to invest in
nice stores. This should make clear the second free-riding problem at
stake in minimum RPM. The first is about retailer-retailer
competition; the second is about how manufacturers interact with
each other when they share retailers. Of course, most retailers are
shared retailers. There is the occasional Apple store and the Nike
Store on Michigan Avenue in Chicago is legendary, but the vast
majority of retailers sell multiple brands. Those brands share retailers.
We now see the hamhandedness of minimum RPM. Minimum
RPM decentralizes the “extra” service decisions to the retailers. The
retailer might invest in more education for HP calculators, and, if so,
HP has taken an important step towards solving the problem of
Reverse Polish notation—though even here, that education benefits
any calculator maker using that notation and so we have another
version of the free-riding problem—but the retailer might just as well
spend the money on nicer fixtures, and HP gets no particular benefit
from that.
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Consider a natural alternative: a direct contractual provision from
the manufacturer requiring that education be provided.90 As a
nonprice vertical restraint, an education provision would be judged
under the rule of reason under the rule announced in Sylvania. If the
manufacturer believes that education is best provided at each place
the product is sold, the manufacturer presumably will require such
education in each retail contract. If instead the manufacturer believes
that it is important that education be available in each market, the
manufacturer will have different contracts for each retailer.
Of course, providing education isn’t free, and the manufacturer
would need to compensate retailers for providing the education. But
if direct payments are made, much of the air is gone from the freeriding balloon. Indeed, if the manufacturer “overpays” for education,
retailers will fight to provide education. And an education clause, like
any other clause in a contract, needs to be enforced to work and that
requires the manufacturer to create some enforcement mechanism.
Nothing in the core service theory of minimum RPM tells us
where the push for extra services should come from. Manufacturers
may understand from the get-go that their products need special
handling and, if so, they may initiate minimum RPM. But in other
cases, retailers may be closer to customers and may have a better
understanding of the need for extra service. These retailers also may
see more directly how the free-riding dynamic operates day-by-day.
In those cases, we should expect to see retailers pushing the
manufacturer to implement minimum RPM. In the extreme case, the
push might be purely horizontal. How should we treat these cases?91
The direction of the push shouldn’t matter. We would have to be
much more confident than I see reason to be about where the
information regarding the importance of services is likely to lie.

90 Leegin Transcript at *41.
91 At oral argument, Justice Stevens addressed the possibility of a purely horizontal
cartel designed to promote interbrand competition. Leegin Transcript at *4-5, 20-21.
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Although there seems to be no logical reason to exclude the
possibility that a local horizontal cartel might facilitate interbrand
competition, we might administratively want to use the
manufacturer’s agreement to that practice as a way to separate out
pernicious horizontal agreements from those that actually promote
interbrand competition. The manufacturer has a shared interest in
seeing the latter and strong interests in opposing the former.
Requiring the smart retailers to persuade the manufacturer to
implement minimum RPM means we avoid having horizontal cartels
spring up in the guise of providing better services.
Leegin also shouldn’t be understood as changing our basic rules
about the per se illegality of horizontal cartels. Justice Stevens’s
questions at oral argument suggested that he recognized that the
analytical framework of using minimum RPM to produce retail
services meant that there could be net benefits from some retailer
cartels. These would be cartels limiting intrabrand competition in an
effort to induce service provision and doing so in a context where
there was extensive interbrand competition. On those facts, the
retailers shouldn’t have meaningful market power, and the intrabrand
cartel would just be making possible a new price/services
combination.
But Leegin doesn’t go this far and, for now at least, we will
continue to treat these horizontal cartels as per se illegal. Given that,
we shouldn’t need the rule in Dr. Miles to get at horizontal cartels—
good or bad—implemented by retailers. That is, we shouldn’t need
to condemn every instance of minimum RPM to make sure that we
have blocked situations in which harmful retailer-led horizontal
cartels have been dressed up as minimum RPM.
In Leegin, the Court also focused on the transaction costs of Dr.
Miles. Manufacturers who want to implement minimum RPM can
do so as long as they proceed unilaterally and comply with Colgate;
what they couldn’t do was implement minimum RPM through
agreements that violated Dr. Miles. But even after Leegin with Dr.
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Miles gone, some manufacturers will continue to try to meet Colgate.
A manufacturer who stays on the Colgate side of the Dr. Miles/Colgate
line avoids the Section 1 rule-of-reason inquiry entirely. For that
manufacturer, there is no triggering contract, combination or
conspiracy and hence no possibility of Section 1 liability. Unilateral
activity is dealt with under Section 2, but Section 2 requires
monopolization, and that is more than just the market power that
will trigger liability under Section 1. With Dr. Miles gone, some
manufacturers will switch to contractual minimum RPM and accept
that they may face a possible Section 1 rule-of-reason inquiry. Others
may continue to implement the Colgate version of RPM if they wish
to avoid Section 1 risk entirely.
D. STARE DECISIS AND STATUTES: PRIOR COURT DECISIONS AS STARTING POINTS
FOR CONGRESS

Now switch to stare decisis. We start by mapping the lay of the land
in antitrust. For doing that, almost any starting point would be
arbitrary, but given that Leegin overturns Dr. Miles, we might start
our analysis of stare decisis from a point where the Court didn’t
overturn Dr. Miles, its 1984 decision in Monsanto.92 Monsanto was
the first of five antitrust cases decided during the Court’s 1983
Term.93 The Solicitor General had asked the Court to reconsider Dr.
Miles in Monsanto, but in a footnote, the Court declined to do so.
Justice Brennan’s brief concurring opinion focused exclusively on the
status of Dr. Miles. He emphasized the opinion’s longevity—73 years
at that point—and the fact that Congress had never enacted
legislation to overrule Dr. Miles.94
The 1983 Term is also interesting for the different ways that the
cases approached stare decisis. In Jefferson Parish, the Court

92 Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp, 465 US 752, 761 (1984).
93 For discussion of those cases, see Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five
Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 Sup Ct Rev 69.
94 Monsanto Co, 465 US at 768.
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considered the law of tying, that is, the circumstances under which a
seller forces a purchaser to take one product with a second product.95
The question of whether or not to abandon the Court’s prior rule
that tying cases should receive per se treatment divided the Court.
The five-member majority believed that it was “far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that
certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se’.”96 The Court
saw a steady line of support for per se treatment going back to 1947
(International Salt) if not earlier.97 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, concurred briefly pointing to his earlier concurring opinion
in Monsanto and emphasizing that Congress had left alone the
Court’s prior per se treatment of tying.98 But for Justice O’Connor
and the other three justices joining her opinion concurring in the
judgment, it was time “to abandon the ‘per se’ label and refocus the
inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic
benefits, that the tie may have.”99
But less than three months later, the Court took a different
approach to stare decisis in antitrust. In Copperweld,100 the Court
considered the question of whether a parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary were legally capable of conspiring under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Yes, the two were distinct legal entities and hence could
contract with each other, but was that what Section 1 was looking for

95 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984).
96 Id at 9.
97 International Salt Co v United States, 332 US 392 (1947).
98 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 32 (“Whatever merit the policy arguments against this

longstanding construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our
decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the Act. In such circumstances, our
practice usually has been to stand by a settled statutory interpretation and leave the task of
modifying the statute’s reach to Congress”).
99 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 35.
100 Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752 (1984).
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in its focus on “every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade?” In a 5-3 decision, the
Court concluded that the parent and the sub lacked sufficient
separateness for Section 1 purposes. In so doing, the Court
“disapproved and overruled” its prior decisions that were inconsistent
with the rule announced in Copperweld. Which ones exactly was a
point of dispute between the majority and the dissenters. In dissent,
Justice Stevens counted at least seven decisions of the Court that he
believed to be inconsistent with Copperweld101 going as far back to
1947 (Yellow Cab).102 The majority attempted to recharacterize most
of the cases to suggest that they could have been decided on an
alternative basis and to suggest that the issue had never been
considered in real depth by the Court.103 Justice Stevens noted that
Congress could have revised the Court’s prior rulings on capacity to
contract for Section 1 purposes but had declined to do so over four
decades.104
From the 1983 Term through the 2006 Term—24 terms—the
Supreme Court decided 51 antitrust cases, or an average of more than
two per term.105 We can try a mechanical approach to the role of
stare decisis in antitrust. Of these 51 decisions, only five used the
phrase “stare decisis”: Leegin (2007); State Oil (1997); Eastman Kodak
(1992); Square D (1986); and Copperweld (1984)). That suggests
immediately one of weaknesses of the “tag cloud” approach to
matching text and ideas: both Jefferson Parish and Monsanto are

101 Copperweld, 467 US at 779-782.
102 United States v Yellow Cab Co, 332 US 218 (1947).
103 Copperweld, 467 US at 760 (“Although the Court has expressed approval of the

doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but
perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result”).
104 Id at 784.
105 51 is the number that emerges from the Westlaw search, run on Nov 21, 2007, on
the Supreme Court database using the search request “to(29t) and date(after 1983) and
sy(antitrust sherman clayton (federal +1 trade +1 commission).”
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missing from the list, even though it was precisely the question of
stare decisis that separated the justices in Jefferson Parish and even
though Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Monsanto is almost
exclusively about the importance of not overturning prior decisions of
the Court.
We should start with a basic conception of stare decisis and then
work up from there. A minimalist approach to stare decisis might
focus on almost a physical notion of repeatability: if the same inputs
go into the same production system, the same output should result.
Treat the Court as a thing unto itself; not something made up of a
changing slate of nine individuals but instead as a coherent, integral
entity. In that formulation, mere changes in Court personnel
shouldn’t change case outcomes. If the Court reaches a conclusion, if
the same arguments are subsequently presented to a different
instantiation of the Court, the same outcome should result. This isn’t
to say that the Court can’t learn and therefore change results.
Operating experience under one rule and new arguments should
move the Court just as they do individuals, but it is precisely these
input changes that should result in different outcomes, not change in
the Court itself.
We might think that an odd, sterile and mechanical conception
of what the Court is. Do we really think that a Court comprised of
nine male justices would approach, say, the First Amendment status
of pornography in the same fashion as an all-female Court? If you
think not, then you probably believe that one of the inputs brought
to Court decision-making are the individual experiences of the
justices. We can submit the same briefs to one Court and then
resubmit them to a new Court and see different results because the
individual experiences of the justices shape outcomes.
We might think of stare decisis then as about the size of a
required change necessary to reach a different result, where stare
decisis might address either the non-court inputs to decisionmaking
or the court process itself. The input version of stare decisis would
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focus on the required change in inputs that would permit the Court
to change outcomes. A thin-version might mean that even small
changes in inputs would cause the Court to change outcomes. So
even weak new arguments or small changes in data would cause the
Court to overrule a prior decision. A thick-input version of stare
decisis would require much more substantial changes in
circumstances before the Court would abandon prior positions.
A personnel-version of stare decisis might focus on voting rules
for cases, which the Court might implement by adopting a supermajority decision rule for overruling prior cases. Don’t overrule if the
vote is only 5-4 in favor; instead, require greater unanimity than
that.106 To be mechanical about this, a 6-3 or better rule would mean
that a one-member change on the Court wouldn’t by itself change
results. A 5-4 case in one term couldn’t become a 5-4 decision the
other way if one of the original five justices were replaced by a new
justice who held the opposite view of the question.
The Court hasn’t articulated stare decisis in this fashion. Instead,
as Justice Breyer’s dissent in Leegin emphasized, the Court has
typically proceeded under a multi-factor approach. So the Court
believes that stare decisis weighs more heavily when it construes
statutes than when it reads the Constitution.107 This is based on the
view that, save for rare amendments to the Constitution, only the
Court can change how the Constitution is applied, but Congress can
rewrite statutes if the Court has misunderstood statutory text.
Congress’s knowing inaction then amounts to a type of silent
ratification of the Court’s interpretation of a particular statute.
That analysis dramatically overstates the ease with which
Congress can overturn the Court’s statutory interpretations. This
106 Compare Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116

Yale L J 676 (2007).
107 In antitrust, see, eg, Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736 (1977) (“[W]e
must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation”).
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isn’t about the normal difficulties of getting legislation enacted in the
U.S.—though those hurdles are genuine—but much more about the
Court’s power to select positions strategically and know that they
won’t be overturned. Take a simple example. Assume the relevant
statute bears two natural interpretations. If the Court chooses one
and both the House and the Senate disagree with the Court’s choice,
we should expect Congress to rewrite the statute. In contrast, if the
Court chooses the interpretation favored by both chambers, Congress
leaves the statute alone. This seems to be the framework that
animates the Court’s views on the importance of stare decisis in cases
dealing with statutes.
But consider two other possibilities. The Senate and the House
have different preferences over the two natural readings of the statute.
The Court will choose one or the other, and whichever one the Court
chooses, we will not see legislation overturning that choice. If the
Court chooses the interpretation favored by the Senate, the Senate
will block legislation overturning that choice, and both the Senate
and the House must approve new legislation for it go forward.
Alternatively, if the Court chose the House’s favored interpretation,
the House will block new legislation.
In this simple situation—a statute with two natural readings—we
have four possibilities. We will see responsive legislation in only one
case—when the Court gets it “wrong” and the Senate and the House
both disagree with that choice—but in the other three cases, we
won’t see new legislation. In only one of those situations should the
Court infer acquiescence in the Court’s read of the statute; in the
other two cases, the two chambers don’t agree and therefore can’t
agree to overturn the Court’s interpretation. Note also that an
especially strategic Congress wanting to send information to the
Court might choose to pass confirmatory legislation in the case in
which the Congress agrees with the Court’s reading of the statute.
Given the presumed agreement between the houses, it should be
relatively costless to pass the confirming statute. The point of that

Randy Picker

Page 48

1/25/2008

Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust

legislation isn’t to change the meaning of the text but to make clear
that when the Court interprets statutory text and nothing issues from
Congress, Congress disagrees internally over the meaning of the text.
Guaranteed action in both cases in which Congress agrees internally
would convey information to the Court about the existence of
internal disagreement in Congress over the meaning of the relevant
text in cases in which Congress doesn’t act.
Play this out briefly one more time. Imagine a text with three
readings, where the House’s preferences are 1 > 2 > 3 and the Senate’s
are just the opposite, 3 > 2 > 1. We shouldn’t expect Congress to
overturn any decision of the Court choosing any of the readings. If
the Court chooses 1, the House is happy and will block new
legislation. Ditto for the Senate if the Court chooses 3. And 2
probably represents the compromise position that would be reached
by Congress were it required to act. A decision by the Court followed
by congressional inaction would tell us nothing about congressional
acquiesce in the Court’s reading. The Court’s approach to stare
decisis for statutes and its power to draw inferences from
congressional inaction and silence has ignored the way that that the
Court’s prior interpretation of a statute determines the default
position in the next round of legislative gamesmanship. As these
examples suggest, the default position established by the Court
matters enormously for the subsequent legislative path.
What does this mean for the Court’s special rules of stare decisis
for statutes, taking seriously, of course, that those rules actually exist
meaningfully? The Court should kill them off. Return to the simple
four-possibility situation. If the Court chooses the wrong
interpretation and Congress overturns it, very little harm is done. If
the Court reaches the result desired by both houses of Congress, we
probably won’t see legislation, absent the sort of exquisite legislative
signaling that I describe above. But in that case, the Court has
adopted the interpretation favored by the current Congress. And, to
head towards stare decisis, if the Court flipped its position, in these
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cases, Congress would respond. The agreed Congress would overturn
the contrary interpretation by the Court.
But if the Court chooses an interpretation and Congress is
disabled from acting, what should the Court do in reconsidering the
issue? For constitutional issues, Congress is disabled from acting by
institutional design, as we have assigned the role of constitutional
interpreter to the Court. In our two remaining cases, Congress is
disabled from acting not by design but because of internal
disagreement. By definition, that internal disagreement is just the
opposite of acquiescence in the Court’s view. One chamber favors
one interpretation, the other the second, and that will be true
regardless of which interpretation the Court chooses. Under those
circumstances, the Court should give no special weight to that
disagreement in figuring out whether to reconsider its prior ruling
but instead should rely on whatever general framework the Court
brings to stare decisis.
What does that mean for Leegin? In my view, the Court majority
appropriately gave very little weight to Congress’s changes to Section
1. Recall that Section 1 expanded in 1937 with the Miller-Tydings
fair trade delegation to the states and then contracted in 1975 when
Congress reclaimed federal authority under Section 1. But the Court
didn’t take that to somehow limit its ability to continue to evolve
Section 1 antitrust doctrine, and it understood itself to have full
authority to overturn Dr. Miles. That isn’t to say that the Court was
right to overturn Dr. Miles, as all I have done above is to sketch some
general ways to frame stare decisis and I haven’t offered a full theory
of it, but it is to say that the fact that Dr. Miles interprets a statute
shouldn’t be given real weight in the stare decisis analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
So there were four antitrust decisions of note in the 2006 Term.
Weyerhaeuser is a small, modest decision. The Court isn’t likely to see
another predatory bidding case soon and the Court chose to
minimize doctrinal complexity by bringing predatory bidding analysis
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in sync with the Court’s prior treatment of predatory pricing in
Brooke Group. Credit Suisse too is minimally incremental. In
concluding that federal securities law “implicitly” precluded claims
asserting antitrust violations in the sale of new securities, the Court
followed its prior decision in Gordon as well as the Court’s more
recent preference for regulatory schemes over antitrust as seen in
Trinko. Pushing antitrust authority toward specialized regulators like
the Securities and Exchange Commission broadens the trade-offs that
can be made between antitrust concerns and other values and almost
certainly expands the circumstances under which industry actors can
act collectively. That matters, so Credit Suisse covers more of the
economic landscape than Weyerhaeuser, but the decision itself is a
small step from prior doctrine.
Twombly and Leegin are each, in their own ways, blockbusters.
Twombly will appear in case after case, as antitrust defendants try to
rely on its new tougher rules for FRCP 12(b)(6) motions. Twombly
represents a preference for blunt instruments over sharp edges. The
central problem confronted by Twombly is discovery run amok. The
Court has the tools in its hands to control that by rewriting the
discovery rules and overturning lower court decisions implementing
those rules. Twombly suggests that the Court believes that refinement
of those rules will fail in controlling discovery and it is willing to pay
the price that private plaintiffs will have no good way to get at the
best-hidden antitrust conspiracies.
Finally, Leegin brings to a close—for now or forever?—the 100year saga of contractual minimum resale price maintenance. Since its
decision in 1911 in Dr. Miles, the Court has confronted this issue
again and again in the slightly-refined versions that make up the art
of institutional design. Over time, the Court has chipped away at Dr.
Miles, first in not finding a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
for the unilateral minimum RPM in Colgate in 1919 and in then
broadly subjecting nonprice vertical restraints to rule-of-reason
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treatment in Sylvania in 1977. Given that, on what basis would Dr.
Miles survive?
That is a question of stare decisis and Leegin ends up in an all-out
fight over stare decisis in antitrust. That is new: the Court has been
overturning old decisions in antitrust for some time and has done so
with little stare decisis fanfare. That suggests that the dispute over
stare decisis in Leegin is just a convenient forum for the larger dispute
over stare decisis that is percolating through a divided Court. I don’t
have a full-blown theory of stare decisis but I do suggest why the
Court has been mistaken to treat stare decisis in statutory cases
differently from that in constitutional cases. The Court has made too
little of one of its critical tools in shaping statutes, namely, the power
to set a default point for subsequent congressional action. Once we
treat the Court’s decisions as inputs in subsequent lawmaking, there
is greater reason to think that the Court should have a uniform
approach to stare decisis across the Constitution and statutes.
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